ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 191 scientific inferences about causation and contrast this with post-Daubert tort practices.
II. CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A CLASSIC ENVIRONMENTAL DISEASE
The earliest cases of childhood lead poisoning undoubtedly occurred many centuries ago. Lead pipes and pots were used for carrying water, cooking, preserving wine, and lead poisoning was recognized as a health hazard from the era of Hippocrates, approximately 400 B.C.
14 Subsequently, lead was a component of pottery glazes and other manufactured goods leading to periodic outbreaks of lead poisoning long before the modern era. 15 From a public health perspective, however, childhood lead poisoning has been reported as a widespread problem only in the past one hundred years or so. 16 The earliest cases were associated with ingestion of leadbased paint in homes and with the burning of lead batteries for fuel in poor communities during the winter. 17 In the United States, the first efforts to determine the full extent of the problem of childhood lead poisoning were in Baltimore, Maryland.
18 These early studies focused on the gross effects of high-level exposure and a condition called "plumbism," characterized by acute gastrointestinal symptoms, neurological symptoms such as seizures, and occasionally coma or even death. 19 Efforts to reduce exposure were focused on peeling paint in dilapidated inner-city housing and blood levels of clinical concern were reported in the medical literature. 20 In the 1960s and 1970s, additional research showed that subtle effects, such as diminished IQ and behavioral and learning problems, were occurring at lower levels of exposure (see Appendix A). 21 This led to more intensive efforts to identify children at risk of these health effects, and a national plan to reduce childhood lead poisoning by eliminating lead-based paint for household use. 22 Unfortunately, a massive amount of lead was already present in the environment due to previous applications of lead paint and from exhaust from automobiles burning gasoline with lead additives 23 24 and achieved only moderate gains in communities with additional sources of funds from federal agencies. 25 In some states, such as Massachusetts and Maryland, local laws and state-level initiatives have led to more comprehensive childhood blood lead screening programs and abatement of lead paint hazards. 26 For example, Massachusetts has a very high estimated percentage of screening in high-risk communities and has removed or reduced lead paint hazards in thousands of dwellings where young children live. 27 This proactive approach resulted from the combined activities of pediatricians and primary healthcare providers, local and state health departments, and property owners. 28 This state-level program also provides for the training and licensing of lead paint removal workers and contractors. 29 The number of units inspected and where lead paint hazards have been abated has been impressive, but other states have been less aggressive and less successful over the past two decades. 30 The second major source of lead in young children's environment has been leaded gasoline. 31 This source is equally widespread, although less concentrated than lead-based paint. 32 The history of the use of lead as an additive to reduce engine knock in automobile engines has been well documented, 33 and is an example of scientific information dismissed in the interests of promoting an industry. Concern about this source of childhood lead exposure compelled Congress to ban leaded gasoline in the 1970s under the Clean Air Act. 34 At about the same time, the Consumer Product Safety Commission severely restricted the amount of lead allowed in household paint. 35 Thus, in the 1970s the federal government likewise took aim at the two largest sources of lead in the United States. Since that time, the amount of lead in children's blood has steadily declined (see Appendix B) and is one of the clear cut examples of how regulatory action can have an immediate positive impact on children's exposure to an environmental hazard.
As more has been learned about the harmful effects of lead in developing children, the blood lead levels that are considered "undue lead absorption" have come down correspondingly. For example, the level of concern in the early 1970s was 40 micrograms per 100 milliliters of whole blood; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") lowered this level to 30 micrograms per 100 Based on current knowledge, the CDC's position is that "no threshold has been determined regarding lead's harmful effects on children's learning or behavior."
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In the late 1970s, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey estimated that 88.2% of children between the ages of one and five in the United States had blood lead levels greater than 10 mcg. 38 By the late 1980s, this survey indicated that the percentage of U.S. children with this blood lead level had declined to 8.6%.
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The latest available survey data, from the years 1999-2000, indicates that this percentage is now 2.2%, or 434,000 children in the United States. 40 The 1991 public health goal for the nation of reducing to zero the number of children with blood lead levels greater than 25 micrograms by the year 2000 was not met, and the CDC has now set a new goal of reducing the number of children with levels greater than 10 micrograms by the year 2010.
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In conjunction with the increased knowledge about the sources and effects of lead on young children, legislation and judicial precedent have established legal remedies for victims of lead poisoning. For example, the Massachusetts statute 42 and associated regulations 43 provide for fines and civil actions to require property owners to remove lead paint hazards from homes where children under age six reside. 44 This law has been used for three decades to require de-leading, and occasionally has forced rental property owners to enter into consent decrees to make major renovations to deteriorating properties. In addition, attorneys have brought civil actions for damages to clients who were lead poisoned and have suffered neurological effects. The largest settlement of such a case in Massachusetts was announced in September 2003; the property management company agreed to pay $4 million to four individuals who had resided in a hazardous property in the mid-1980s and subsequently were unable to finish high school or get jobs. 45 The lesson of childhood lead poisoning is largely one of unheeded early warnings, 46 followed by widespread adverse effects in children throughout the United States, and subsequent legal and regulatory steps to reduce the hazard many years later. literature, and the legal remedies may serve as a warning about future failures to act in time to prevent harm. 47 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER
The correlation of workplace and community exposures and increased cancer risk has been one of the most urgent environmental health issues of the past quarter century. In the United States, much of the concern has focused on toxic chemicals and radiation, both ionizing and non-ionizing, and their relationship to cancer clusters in communities, factories and sometimes schools. Citizens' organizations have focused on dramatic examples, such as incidents in Times Beach, Missouri 48 and Love Canal, New York, 49 both of which were evacuated because of community exposure to dioxin; others have learned from workplace experiences such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, where excess radiation has increased the risk of leukemia deaths in the workforce. 50 Similar concerns followed a disastrous explosion at a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy 51 and the nuclear power plant disaster in Chernobyl, Ukraine.
52 But numerous less-publicized examples have occurred in communities throughout North America, and healthcare and legal professionals are increasingly asked to evaluate the causes and consequences of these worrisome events for communities.
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This Part addresses three aspects of the problem: the background of cancer incidence and mortality against which local clusters are assessed, the types of exposures which are known or suspected causes of such clusters, and the implications for healthcare or legal professionals who wish to provide guidance for concerned patients or communities.
A. UNDERSTANDING RECENT U.S. CANCER TRENDS
Over the past quarter century, the incidence of cancer in the United States has risen steadily, from an age-adjusted rate of 385 cancer diagnoses per 100,000 citizens in 1973 to 476 per 100,000 in 1999. 54 The age-adjusted cancer mortality rates in the United States increased during this period as well, yet have recently 47 Current concerns about endocrine-disrupting chemicals and persistent organic pollutants have many of the earmarks of the lead paint and leaded gasoline stories of the past century. declined largely because of improved treatments for some cancers and declining lung cancer mortality in males. 55 While there have been some improvements in the cancer patterns overall, it is instructive to examine some important trends in specific cancer types which may be due to avoidable exposures. Table 1 shows the major types of cancer for which there are significant trends in both incidence and mortality. The decreasing incidence and mortality from stomach cancer has been repeatedly noted, and has been associated with improved methods of storing and preserving food. 57 Likewise, the decreasing incidence and mortality due to cervical cancer is most likely the result of widespread screening efforts and early diagnosis and treatment. 58 On the other hand, cancers for which incidence and mortality continue to increase appear to be similarly avoidable. Lung cancer, particularly in females, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, melanoma of the skin, multiple myeloma and several other, less common malignancies have continually increased.
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Each of these seems to be largely the result of avoidable exposures. For instance, lung cancer is primarily due to exposure to cigarette smoke, 60 melanoma of the skin is strongly linked to frequent exposure to ultraviolet light, 61 and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma has been associated with environmental and occupational exposure to carcinogens. 62 Considerable attention has been paid to the decline in mortality rates from some of the more common types of cancer in the United States over the past decade, 55 Id. including female breast cancer, prostate cancer in males, and lung and colorectal cancers in both sexes. 63 Between 1994 and 2000, the United States experienced a 0.3 to 1.4% annual decline in the age-adjusted cancer death rate for these cancers, which some observers attributed to reduced smoking in males and improved treatment of some cancers.
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These declines are certainly good news for cancer patients, but considering the massive investment in cancer research and screening since the early 1970s, perhaps the most relevant observation is how little progress has been made in reducing cancer death rates.
Another measure of the national cancer burden is the estimated lifetime risk of being diagnosed with an invasive malignancy. This risk is periodically estimated by the National Cancer Institute's Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results ("SEER") program. SEER currently calculates this risk at 47% for males and 39% for females. 65 This means that nearly one out of two males will be diagnosed with invasive cancer, and four out of ten females diagnosed with some form of cancer in their lifetime. These estimates are significantly higher than the often-quoted cancer risk of "one in three." Although this increased lifetime risk partly reflects the overall aging of the U.S. population, it nevertheless implies increased suffering and distress for both cancer patients and their families. This reason alone is sufficient motivation to investigate ways to prevent cancer, along with the ongoing effort to improve treatment and supportive care.
B. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES OF CANCER
Several authors have attempted to quantify the avoidable causes of cancer. In 1981, a widely-cited report by Sir Richard Doll and Richard Peto examined U.S. cancer deaths among white people under age sixty-five, and names tobacco products and dietary factors as the largest contributors to cancer mortality. 66 The proportion of cancer caused by occupational exposures and environmental pollution was comparatively slight.
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A more recent report by the Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention revised these earlier estimates, but still suggested that 30% of total cancer deaths were due to tobacco and another 30% to adult diet or obesity.
68 By contrast, the study accorded only 5% of cancer deaths to occupational factors and a mere 2% to environmental pollution. 69 The accuracy of these estimates is open to question, but it is not productive to trivialize or diminish a particular avoidable cause simply because it does not equal the large impact of a well-known culprit like tobacco on the overall cancer burden. Clearly, some factors interact and magnify the INST. 1191 INST. (1981 . This was the first major attempt to quantify the factors which contribute to cancer deaths in the United States and was cited for many years, even though it is restricted to white deaths under age sixty-five, or less than half of the total cancer deaths. 67 Id.
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Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention, Harvard Report on Cancer Prevention, 7 CANCER CAUSES CONTROL S1 (1996) . This analysis attempted to update the Doll and Peto analysis with more recent studies. The goal, then, should be to reduce all avoidable cancer risks wherever and whenever the opportunity arises.
Melanoma of the skin and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma have both been increasing rapidly over the past two or three decades; both of these are significantly linked to environmental and occupational exposures, such as ultraviolet light 72 or chemical solvents, 73 in addition to inherited predisposition. 74 The International Agency for Research on Cancer ("IARC") has listed two dozen individual agents, summarized in Table 2 below, known to cause cancer in humans. Scientists are currently evaluating other potential carcinogens which may pose a major public health risk for industrialized nations, including electric and magnetic fields and environmental estrogens.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CANCER PREVENTION
Much of the concern about environmental causes of cancer has arisen due to widely publicized events such as toxic pollution in communities containing industrial sites or radiation in those located in proximity to nuclear facilities. Many of these events are localized and the exposed population may be limited to the industrial workers or the communities immediately surrounding the facilities. Nevertheless, because exposed communities include children, infants, the elderly, and other sensitive populations, many community residents may be considerably more susceptible to effects from prolonged low-level exposure than are typical healthy adults. Newborns exposed to radioactive iodine, for example, are more likely to develop thyroid cancer than are adults with equivalent exposure. 78 This example and others demonstrate the importance of setting community exposure limits, through environmental regulation, below permissible adult workplace exposure limits for the same substance.
While recent downward trends in cancer mortality are gratifying, there are ongoing, yet avoidable, environmental and occupational exposures in many communities and workplaces. For example, the continuing problem of stratospheric ozone depletion means that exposure to ultraviolet radiation and the consequent risk of skin cancer will be a public health concern for decades to come. 79 Similarly, ongoing exposure to carcinogenic chemicals in the workplace must be minimized and safer substitutes must be found for many industrial materials. Rather than attempting to diminish such problems, or rank them below other cancer causes, it is in everyone's best interest to take environmental and occupational carcinogens seriously and seek opportunities to prevent further public exposure.
Toxic tort litigation has also been a mechanism for both resolving disputes between polluting companies or industries and individuals or communities who have been harmed. This approach has become more common in the past two decades, and has been popularized in books and movies in the past decade. The book and movie based on the experience of citizens in Woburn, Massachusetts, some of whom sought a verdict and civil damages award for the loss of children who died of leukemia, provided some insight into the difficulties surrounding such litigation. What follows is a summary of how epidemiologists evaluate scientific information and reach conclusions about causation in toxic torts.
IV. EPIDEMIOLOGY IN TOXIC TORTS
Epidemiologists concerned with the causes that contribute to human cancer risk routinely use the guidelines established by Sir Austin Bradford Hill, one of the twentieth century's leading statisticians, as a set of useful tools for drawing scientific inferences and deductions about causation from all the available relevant principles, data, information, and observations. 82 We present here a discussion of how epidemiologists inquire into the contributions of cancer-causing environmental exposures.
A. USE OF EXPERIMENTAL AND OBSERVATIONAL SCIENCES Scientific practice explores more than questions of causation, but this is a central issue in many tort cases. What does "A causes B" mean to a scientist? Apart from philosophical aspects of scientific causality, most scientists have adopted a pragmatic approach whose formal articulation goes back at least to John Stuart Mill's famous "Method of Difference." 83 Briefly, Mill's Method holds that A causes B if, all else being held constant, a change in A is accompanied by a subsequent change in B. 84 The formal method to detect such an occurrence is the Experiment, whereby:
• all things are held constant except A and B,
• A is varied, and • B observed.
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Not all sciences can use a strictly experimental method, however, and must make observations in the real world and deduce scientific facts by applying reasoning and principles from experimental sciences or logic and mathematics. 86 Geology and epidemiology are such sciences. 87 In one of the sub-disciplines of geology, seismology, scientists observe earthquakes; 88 they certainly do not stage city-sized experiments on the factors that cause earthquakes. The inability of geology or astronomy to conduct full-scale experiments does not connote an inability to conduct good science, or that the science involved is inherently more Scientists may, however, extrapolate from laboratory scale experiments to make scientifically defensible statements about the origins of "dark energy" in space or the causes of earthquakes on our planet. 90 There may be disagreement among experts as to the aptness of a particular extrapolation or inference, but generally there is no disagreement that the process of applying events or principles observed on the scale of the laboratory bench to events occurring on the scale of a geographic region is scientifically defensible, and indeed something similar is the norm in virtually all observational sciences.
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In the biological sciences, in general, and in the public health field, in particular, inferences for one group of humans are regularly drawn from epidemiological studies from another group of humans. 92 Significantly, inferences about humans are also made on the basis of observations of, or laboratory experimentation on, animals.
93 Indeed, the scientific reasonableness of drawing inferences from animals to humans provides the principal justification for the decision of National Institutes of Health to devote hundreds of millions of dollars funds to animal research. 94 Any particular inference may be arguable, and certainly may be the basis of a dispute between the parties in a lawsuit, but the method and reasoning are not subject to debate.
In general there are three sources of information on the effects of toxic exposures in human beings: (1) case reports; (2) toxicological research, including both animal studies and chemical or structural research; and (3) epidemiological studies.
Use of Case Reports Regarding Human Beings
A case report in medical or scientific literature of a single case or series of cases is one of the most important sources of information scientists have regarding the effects of toxic substances on human beings. 95 Indeed, case reports are often the only source of such information. Detailed reports of cases of accidental poisonings or suicides provide information, such as autopsy data, biopsies, and detailed clinical data, not obtainable by any other route. Moreover they constitute important and obvious "natural experiments," experiments where the relationship between the exposure and effect is usually clear. The use of case reports in medicine is longstanding and important, as evidenced by the continued appearance of such reports in the literature. 97 The essence of an experiment is the control of all factors, except for A and B.
98 This kind of control allows the scientist to ask quite precise questions about explicitly defined As and Bs, and obtain relatively unambiguous answers. 
Use of Epidemiological Studies
Epidemiological studies are observations of "natural experiments" that are occurring in the real world. 100 The idea is to find situations which are almost like laboratory experiments, observe them, obtain as much information as possible, and then interpret the results. 101 The essence of the natural experiment in epidemiology is almost always a comparison between groups; for example, a group exposed to a chemical and an unexposed group.
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The ideal situation would be to have the groups in the real world the same or comparable in all relevant respects except for the variable under study. Unfortunately, such natural groupings are rarely comparable, and techniques must be used to account for known differences. 103 However, not all sources of non-comparability are known. If not a necessary accompaniment of the variable being investigated, these residual factors fall by chance in the two groups being compared. The result is that there are usually differences solely attributable to the random way these factors are distributed between groups in the particular study. 104 The "chance" fluctuations in apparently otherwise similar populations require an epidemiologist to use statistical tools to evaluate the role of "noise" that might be obscuring an underlying "signal." 105 Observing unintended or "natural" experiments in the real world, which is the essence of observational sciences like epidemiology, has the enormous advantage that it involves human beings living under conditions similar to ones endured by plaintiffs in a personal injury suit. Nonetheless, questions inevitably arise about the biological and scientific comparability, and thus the legal relevance or "fit" of the people, exposures, and diseases studied in one place and time, and other people at other places and times. Questions such as whether the comparison of the cases and controls was truly comparing "like with like," are precisely the kind of problems that 97 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. In view of the fact that different scientific disciplines have disparate strengths and weaknesses, and the propensity of scientists to disagree, the key question for scientists and courts becomes determining how scientists decide which studies, data, experiments, and articles to use and rely on, and for what purposes. In other words, how do they interpret and apply the results of scientific studies?
B. HOW SCIENTISTS MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT CAUSALITY
It is well known that when different scientists interpret the same studies they do not always reach the same conclusion. How and why do scientists interpret the "same" basic facts, the same set of numbers, the same research report, in different ways?
Two aspects and tools of scientific interpretation are relevant to this discussion. In the literature of scientific methodologies they are commonly (but not invariably) referred to as internal and external validity. 108 Internal validity refers to a judgment about the extent to which the experiment or study produces valid information on its own terms. 109 Thus, for internal validity the crucial question to be answered is not, "If benzene causes cancer in C57BL/6 mice, does it also do so in Wistar rats or humans?" but rather "Did the experiment validly show that benzene caused cancer in C57BL/6 mice?" External validity, on the other hand, refers to a judgment about the extent to which the internally valid results of an experiment or study can be generalized to other situations. 110 Thus, for external validity, the crucial question is not "Did the experimental evidence adequately demonstrate that benzene causes cancer in Wistar rats?" but rather "If benzene does cause cancer in Wistar rats, does it also do so in humans?"
At the heart of a case report, a toxicological experiment, or an epidemiologic study lies a comparison. Case reports usually call the attention of the medical community to an "interesting" observation, as compared with a previous or usual experience, such as a rare disease in the context of an unusual exposure. 111 In an experiment, the comparison is between the different states of B, when A is varied.
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Take as an example a study comparing the health outcome of two distinct groups of human beings: one group comprised of factory workers who were exposed to a chemical used in the production process, and the other group consisting of all members of the general population, most (but perhaps not all) of whom were not exposed to the chemical. Suppose the workers have more disease than the general population. 114 There are three generic reasons such a difference, or lack thereof, might be observed, referred to as "bias," "chance," and real effect. 115 These factors are conceptually independent, but not mutually exclusive, forces.
116 That is, all or some of the forces can operate simultaneously. Each must be evaluated to extract a valid message ("the real picture" or "true signal") from the study. 117 1. The Role of "Bias"
Another term for "bias" is "systematic error." 118 This differs somewhat from the common usage of the word, and in epidemiology the word has been refined and qualified to encompass a wide variety of sources of systematic error, each given a name. 119 For example, epidemiologists talk of various kinds of "information bias,"
such as "recall bias," "observation bias," or "differential or non-differential misclassification bias," as well as types of "selection bias" and "confounding bias".
120
All biases have as their underlying mechanisms factors that make the compared groups different in ways other than just the variable being studied.
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Because the object of an experiment or study is to isolate one element (exposure to the chemical in my example), one must estimate the effect of the uncontrolled differences on the comparison.
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A common source of potential bias in an epidemiological study is "confounding," and we illustrate this with an example. Suppose scientists were comparing cancer rates in two groups. As in all epidemiological studies, this comparison is of the nature of an experiment, but one that is "handed to us" by nature, not one of our own devising. Thus, scientists are unable to control everything they might like in this comparison. 123 It might be, for example, that the workers in this hypothetical instance are considerably younger than the general population, and because cancer risks rise with age, they would be expected to have less cancer than the comparison group. If this difference were not somehow accounted for, the observed increase in the number or incidence of cancers in the worker group is actually likely to underestimate the true effect. The same noncomparability could influence a comparison in the opposite way if the workers were on average older than the general population. 114 Note that the analysis works just as well in a case where there is no increased disease. 115 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DIOXIN REASSESSMENT REVIEW, sec. 4.5.1, at http://www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/ec95021.pdf (Sept. 29, 1995 123 Epidemiologists often find that there are unanticipated problems or uncertainties in conducting epidemiologic studies, and that other epidemiologists usually are quick to point these out. As with most things, designing an informative study is difficult. Criticizing one is easy.
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The most important means of coping with bias is to recognize it. An important part of the training and practice of an epidemiologist is to recognize and account for the effects of the inevitable non-comparability found in observational studies. 124 Once recognized, an epidemiologist can often gauge the impact of a source of bias on the results and adjust conclusions accordingly. Sometimes the data themselves can be "adjusted" or "controlled" to eliminate the non-comparability in the two groups for certain factors like age or sex. Not all sources of non-comparability are known. 126 Providing that they are not a necessary accompaniment of the variable being investigated, these residual factors are distributed by chance between the two groups being compared. The result is that there are usually differences solely attributable to the random way these factors are distributed between groups in the particular study. The "chance" fluctuations in apparently otherwise similar populations require an epidemiologist to use special tools to discern the true meaning from the chaos of disparate data-to see the true picture amidst a welter of images, or to hear the true, underlying "signal" in the midst of the noise produced by these variations. 127 The mathematical tools used for these purposes involve statistical analysis.
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The main purpose for statistics in epidemiology, then, is to evaluate the role that random effects or "chance" might have played in the results. Statistical methods do not prove that chance is the source of a difference, or lack thereof 129 . These methods only provide information on how likely it is that chance could have played a part if there were no bias and no true effect. 130 The meaning of "statistical significance" is that the likelihood that chance could have produced the observed results if there were no bias and no real effect is less than some arbitrarily predetermined level, such as 5% or p<.05.
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It is not the same as an "error rate," as some have interpreted the Daubert decision to mean. . 125 Id. 126 This is a deterministic view of disease causation. One could also take a probabilistic view, in which case scientists would have to discuss sample error from some assumed super-population of identical study settings. This alternative view does not affect any of the points made. 127 (1988) . The original source of the 5% criterion is lost in time. It apparently came from the original applications of statistical methods to agricultural experiments and expressed a cost-benefit statement about the expense of redoing a large trial involving a whole growing season and plots of various seeds and fertilizers. Its use for public health purposes might thus be questioned. It is interesting to note that in other sciences, notably, physics, another common criterion for "statistical significance" is not 5% but 10%. In any event, virtually every elementary statistics text warns the student of the highly arbitrary nature of the figure. For the reasons stated above, it is absolutely false-and, indeed, a serious interpretive error-to assert that a result that is not "statistically significant" means the results must be due to chance and only to chance. 133 For these reasons, prominent epidemiologists eschew "statistical significance," believing that it is not a sine qua non of good science and maintaining that it is neither necessary nor appropriate as a requirement for drawing inferences from epidemiologic data.
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These views are hardly new. Instead, they are representative of the views of both the statistician Hill, and some of most highly regarded epidemiologists in this country, such as Drs. Kenneth Rothman and Noel Weiss. Hill chided those who relied on "significance tests" to prove or disprove causation:
No formal tests of significance can answer those questions. ("Is there any other way of explaining the set of facts before us, is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than cause and effect?") Such tests can, and should, remind us of the effects that the play of chance can create, and they will instruct us in the likely magnitude of those effects. Beyond that they contribute nothing to the 'proof' of our hypothesis." -"I wonder whether the pendulum, has not swung too far-not only with the attentive pupils, but with the statisticians themselves. The notion that only when data demonstrate "statistical significance" do epidemiologists draw inferences about observed associations between suspected risk factors and medical conditions is mistaken. Significance testing is nothing more than a statistical technique that attempts to evaluate what is called "chance" as a possible explanation for a set of observations, and classify the observations "significant" or "not significant" based on the likelihood of observing them if there were no relationship between the suspected cause and effect. Testing for significance, however, is often mistaken for a sine qua non of scientific inference. . . . Scientific inference is the practice of evaluating theories. As such, it is a thoughtful process, requiring thoughtful evaluations of possible explanations for what is being observed. Significance testing, on the other hand, is merely a statistical tool that is frequently, but inappropriately, utilized in the process of developing inferences.
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Significance testing, in our opinion and in the view of many respected scientists, places too high a value on a "yes-no" answer to an oversimplified question: Is the probability that the observed association could appear by chance, even if there is no actual relationship, low enough to justify rejection of chance as the explanation of the observed association? 138 The result of using significance testing as the criterion for decision-making is that the focus is changed from the information presented by the observations themselves to conjecture about the role that chance could have played in bringing about those observations. 139 Dr. Rothman has stated the issue in the following way:
With the focus on statistical significance, if chance seems to be a plausible explanation, then other theories are too readily discarded, regardless of how tenable they may be. As a result, effective new treatments have often been overlooked because their effects were judged to be "not significant," despite an indication of efficacy in the data. Conversely, if "significance" seekers find that the results of a study are calculated as improbable on the basis of chance, then chance is often rejected as an explanation when alternative explanations are even less tenable. A better approach to evaluating the error in scientific measurement is the use of "confidence intervals." A confidence interval is a range of possible values for a parameter that is consistent with the observed data within specified limits. The process of calculating a confidence interval within the chosen limits is know as "interval estimation."
An important advantage of interval estimation is that it: "do[es] not require irrelevant null hypothesis to be set up nor [does it] force a decision about 'significance' to be made-the estimates can be presented and evaluated by statistical and other criteria, by the researcher or the reader. In addition the estimates of one investigation can be compared with others. While it is often the case that different measurements or methods The outcomes of statistical tests are strongly influenced by the size of the study population. For small populations, very large observed differences, of substantial public health significance, may still not be statistically significant. 141 That is to say, a large effect that a scientist would take seriously from the public health point of view cannot be differentiated on its face from chance. Either chance or a real causal influence, or even bias, could be responsible for the worrisome effect. Conversely, in large populations, very slight and substantively meaningless differences can be "statistically significant."
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Statistical methods are sometimes viewed as standard, agreed-upon, and mechanical procedures. 143 Scientists even allow computers to do them, seemingly without human intervention. 144 But as any statistician knows, there is a great deal of judgment in deciding which tests to use in which circumstances, which tests are valid in those circumstances, and what they do and do not mean. 145 Less well recognized is that statistics itself is, like all active disciplines, a field in ferment and change. Thus not all statisticians will agree on the propriety of even commonly used tests. 146 In his recent book, Statistical Inference, Michael Oakes has written:
It is a common complaint of the scientist that his subject is in a state of crisis, but it is comparatively rare to find an appreciation of the fact that the discipline of statistics is similarly strife-torn. The typical reader of statistics textbooks could be forgiven for thinking that the logic and role of statistical inference are unproblematic and that the acquisition of suitable significance-testing recipes is all that is required of him.
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of investigation or theoretical approaches lead to 'different' results, this is not a disadvantage; these differences reflect important theoretical differences about the meaning of the research and the conclusions to be drawn from it. And it is precisely those differences which are obscured by simply reporting the significance level of the results. However, scientists must also evaluate the possibility of a concurrent real effect separately, as we now discuss.
Assessing Whether a "Real Effect" is Present in a Research Study
The most important reason for a discrepancy between two study groups, however, is an actual effect or influence from the variable being studied (occupational exposure to a chemical, in my example); in other words, that "A does cause B." As discussed in greater detail below, scientists recognize that "causation" should not be regarded as an experimental or epidemiological result, but rather as a "judgment" made about the experimental or epidemiological data.
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It is apparently not always appreciated that this is true. There is a tendency to believe that somehow "causation" is not a subjective judgment or interpretation but an actual, real, objective, discoverable, and measurable property of a relationship that can be demonstrated empirically, as if some associations had readable labels on them that said "causal" and all scientists need, then, is the right instrument to read the label.
150
In sum, although some scientists may be loathe to admit it, and although many lawyers and judges may not believe it, there is simply no magic formula or easy checklist for making scientific judgments. 148 As expressed by the epidemiologist Kenneth Rothman in his Daubert amicus brief, "The result of using significance testing as a criterion for decision making is that the focus is changed from the information presented by the observations themselves to conjecture about the role chance could have played in bringing about those observations." Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth Rothman et al. Evaluating internal validity requires the assessment of the roles played by bias, chance, and real effect. 167 Each can operate both to reinforce and offset other factors. There is often disagreement among experts, stemming from differing weights each places on the influence of bias, chance and real effect. 168 Such differences in science are common, both in and out of court. The fact that two scientists have different judgments about how much weight to give a study does not demonstrate that either has failed to use scientifically acceptable reasoning, but only that the ultimate opinion about the weight to accord a study is inherently part of the subjective judgment process of scientists. 169 An evaluation of internal validity helps a scientist decide how much to rely on the specific results of a particular experiment or study. It does not tell a scientist how much to extend that result to contexts or situations different than the one studied in the particular study, or how much to generalize the result. Thus, a separate evaluation for external validity is needed.
Scientists observe and experiment in order to generalize; that is, to explain as much of the world as possible. Generalization is the source of science's fascination, power of explanation, and practical importance in the world outside the community of scientists. The limits and extent of the generalization that scientists can draw from a given study constitute the dimensions of the study's external validity. 170 For present purposes, the question is whether research results and conclusions developed in one context, such as a high-dose animal study, can be generalized to cover other contexts, including human exposures and disease.
Because there are no fixed, definite, and generally agreed upon rules about how-and how far-to generalize, each study must be evaluated in a specific context. Still, certain generic questions arise frequently, which we illustrate here with a brief example.
How does a scientist legitimately assert that a generalization that certain substances are likely to cause cancer in humans is valid and reliable? In essence, scientists put forth reasons why such a generalization makes sense, for example, that the animals involved are similar in pertinent respects to humans. This is followed by an examination of reasons that might limit the generalization, for example, that the high doses used may alter the process sufficiently that it no longer applies to human exposures. 171 Defining and constraining generalizations is an active process for forming opinions about studies. Again, there is ample scope for shades of opinion among experts who devote their professional time, resources, and best efforts to these areas of inquiry.
E. DEVELOPING AN OPINION ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
Clinical observations and case reports, epidemiological and animal studies, and toxicological experiments are like pieces of a puzzle, albeit with the difference that the pieces are fit into a picture that is formed in the mind of the scientist. The scientist must also realize that some existing pieces may not fit, and thus may not be used, and that not all of the necessary pieces are available for placement when the scientist completes the process. Thus, fitting the pieces into a scientific picture is a fluid, dynamic, and difficult process.
Depending upon a scientist's judgment of the internal validity or inherent quality of a particular study, an individual "piece" may be clear and well defined, or fuzzy and indefinite. Depending upon a scientist's judgment of external validity of a particular study, he or she may decide that an individual piece forms a large and central part of the picture, is just a small piece on the periphery of the picture, or not part of the picture at all. 172 In addition, a scientist's experience, expertise and basic judgment are involved. The objective for the scientist, then, is to take the available puzzle pieces, judge their internal and external validity, and assemble a theory or working diagnosis. That is, to bring together the clear and definite and the most relevant pieces into a coherent, sensible, comprehensive, and "elegant" picture of "reality," a picture that represents the scientist's decision about "what is happening." 173 Thus, a toxicologist studies cancer in the Zymbal gland in the rat and surmises that there is a mechanism whereby benzene produces damage in that species and which may or may not be relevant to other species, while an epidemiologist looks at cancer risks in human populations and concludes that benzene causes cancer in the human species. Each sees only a part of the picture.
As already noted, interpreting a scientific study for use in assembling a coherent picture requires the use of critical thinking to weigh the various factors that might be responsible for the observed association. 174 This includes evaluating the role played by bias, chance, and real effect, together and separately, and judgments on what generalizations are valid. In such a complex process and with practical matters of consequence at stake, it is not surprising that differences of opinion develop. It is also not surprising that such differences are highlighted and, indeed, magnified by the adversarial legal process. Even when so magnified, such disagreements are not merely artifacts of the adversarial process, or evidence of flawed scientific reasoning or methodology, but essential features of routinely practiced science.
In sum, scientists may, and often do, disagree about which pieces are internally and externally valid, and disagree about just how to assemble the internally and externally valid puzzle pieces. Indeed, most toxic tort litigation involves opposing scientific experts who sharply disagree about the relevance of the puzzle pieces, and how they fit together. 175 What scientists do not disagree about, though, is that they routinely select pieces and assemble such pictures and call the end product of this process an explanation.
V. CONCLUSION
The intersection of the environment and public health is unquestionably of critical importance and has been recognized for centuries. At the same time, this is often a highly contentious area of public health practice, especially when the economic stakes are high. Some of the most illuminating examples are the various effects of lead and other heavy metals on the health and development of children, including the difficulty in reducing exposure long after the harmful effects are known. Public health scientists faced strong opposition from automobile, lead paint and rental property interests when pressing for reductions in childhood lead exposure. 176 Similarly, many occupational and environmental chemicals are now known to cause cancer in humans, including some of the types of cancer that are increasing most rapidly in the United States. Nevertheless, scientists often dispute the contribution of these chemicals in the overall cancer burden and seek to minimize their importance.
In the legal arena, the evidence showing the effect of chemicals in causing cancer can be assembled from a variety of sources. Some victories have been won and have sent a message to the responsible parties, although the burden on plaintiffs has become heavier over the past decade. It is important to continue emphasizing that environmental exposures which cause childhood illnesses and cancer in both children and adults can be avoided. Informed citizens and their representatives can continue to advocate preventive policies and legal remedies. Pressure from these sources provides the best assurance that the mistakes that harmed public health in the past will not be repeated in the future.
